SectionThe Nature of Yehodaya
SectionStructure of Government
SectionBill of Rights
SectionConstitution
SectionQuestions & Answers
Yehodaya — יְהוֹדַיָה
Structure of GovernmentState Budget, Taxation, and Prohibition of Debt

YEHODAYA · יְהוֹדַיָה

State Budget, Taxation, and Prohibition of Debt

Balanced-Budget Requirement and Prohibition of Debt

  • Yehodaya’s economy will be based on a balanced budget and will not be debt-based.
  • The Constitution will prohibit the government, the President, and the Sanhedrin from borrowing money, issuing government bonds, or creating any other financial instrument that imposes a future financial liability upon the state treasury or the citizens.
  • The ceiling of the annual state budget will not be based on estimates or projected future revenue. It will be limited to the average amount of tax revenue actually collected during the two calendar years preceding submission of the budget.

National Stabilization Fund and Revenue Surpluses

  • If actual tax revenue during a fiscal year exceeds the amount projected, the budget surplus will not be used to increase current government expenditure. It will be transferred in full to a National Stabilization Fund.
  • The Stabilization Fund will be maintained as a closed reserve and invested in conservative assets outside Yehodaya’s economy.
  • The government may withdraw money from the fund only to cover a temporary deficit resulting from an unexpected decline in actual tax revenue below the projected level, or during the emergency situations defined below.
  • If a deficit cannot be covered by the Stabilization Fund, the remaining amount will be deducted equally from the budgets of the government ministries during the following fiscal year.

Requirement to Submit a Budget and Work Plans

  • The President must submit a detailed annual budget and a strategic work plan for the following two years to the Sanhedrin for approval at least 60 days before the beginning of the fiscal year.
  • The budget and work plans will include quantitative, measurable, and transparent objectives for every government ministry.
  • The annual budget must be approved by an absolute majority of the full Sanhedrin.
  • Annual work plans will be subject to continuous review and monitoring by the Sanhedrin’s oversight committees.
  • The budget, work plans, performance reports, and Sanhedrin audit reports will be public, transparent, and fully accessible digitally to every citizen in real time.
  • The sole exception will be classified security annexes, which will be presented only to the Sanhedrin’s confidential security committee.
  • Each year, no later than 90 days after the end of the fiscal year, the President will submit to the Sanhedrin and the public an annual report comparing plans with actual performance and precisely detailing compliance with the established objectives and budgets.

Emergency Budget and Temporary Tax

  • The only exceptions to the balanced-budget requirement will be extreme national emergencies: war resulting from foreign aggression, a natural disaster of national scope, or an international emergency beyond the state’s control.
  • The emergency will be declared by the President and will require approval by a qualified majority of two thirds of the Sanhedrin.
  • Exceptional emergency expenditure may be financed only by withdrawing money from the National Stabilization Fund or by imposing a temporary, dedicated emergency tax upon the citizens and residents of the state.
  • Yehodaya’s Constitution will establish an automatic sunset clause for the emergency tax. Collection of the tax will automatically end within 12 months of its imposition or when budgetary balance has been restored and the emergency has ended, whichever occurs first.
  • Extending the tax beyond 12 months will require renewed approval in a referendum.

Locking Tax Rates

The income-tax rate - the uniform flat tax - may not be increased beyond the rate established in the Constitution without the sovereign’s express approval in a referendum.

Mechanism for Termination of Terms Following Failure to Approve a Budget

  • If the Sanhedrin has not approved the state budget by the beginning of the fiscal year, a continuing budget based on the previous year’s budget and adjusted for inflation will automatically take effect for a maximum of 12 months, ensuring the continuity of the state’s essential services.

  • If the authorities have still failed to reach agreement and approve a new budget after 12 months under a continuing budget, a constitutional deadlock will automatically take effect. The following sanctions will be imposed immediately:

    • Suspension of Salaries: The salaries and remuneration of the President, Vice President, all government ministers, and all members of the Sanhedrin will be suspended immediately. The suspension is absolute, and no retroactive payment will be made for the period of delay, even after the budget is approved.
    • Suspension of Legislative and Regulatory Powers: The Sanhedrin will be constitutionally prohibited from debating or enacting any new law. The President and the ministers will be prohibited from issuing new Presidential Regulations or orders, except for operational emergency measures required to protect life or during wartime.

  • These sanctions will remain fully in force until the Sanhedrin approves, by an absolute majority, a compromise agreed upon between the President and the Sanhedrin and adopts the state budget.