Governance, constitution and limits on power

It is not the role of the state to prevent people from becoming wealthy or from using their money to promote ideas. Its role is to prevent economic wealth from being converted into governmental privilege. The problem is not wealthy individuals themselves, but the attempt to use wealth to purchase subsidies, protection from competition, government contracts, exemptions, licenses, or laws serving a private interest.

The first defense against the entanglement of wealth and government is to limit the power of government itself. Yehodaya will not grant subsidies, impose protective tariffs, establish state-owned companies, or intervene in prices. The fewer benefits politicians have to distribute, the less incentive there is to spend money buying access to them.

Political financing will also be subject to clear rules:

• Contributions to campaigns and political parties may be made only by individual citizens of Yehodaya.
• Corporations, companies, nonprofit organizations, labor organizations, and foreign entities may not finance candidates or parties.
• An individual’s contribution to a candidate or party will be capped at an amount set by law.
• The contribution limit will also apply to a candidate’s self-financing, so that personal wealth cannot become a route around the restriction.
• Every contribution will be recorded in a public register and disclosed in real time, together with the donor’s identity and the amount.
• Concealed donations, the use of straw donors, or transfer of money outside the regulated system will be criminal offenses and grounds for disqualification of a candidacy or removal from office.

The state will operate a unified election portal through which every candidate will have the opportunity to present his or her experience, positions, and plans to the public in the same format and under the same conditions. The portal will not prevent anyone from financing additional advertising, but it will ensure that every candidate has a direct way to reach voters even without the backing of wealthy donors or a major political party.

An additional layer of protection is the limitation of the President and members of the Sanhedrin to a single six-year term, with no possibility of reelection. This reduces the possibility of turning politics into a profession and of building, over decades, a network of donors, associates, and mutual dependency. An elected official who is not running for reelection does not need to finance a future campaign and cannot use public office as the foundation for a permanent political career.

A single term also reminds the officeholder that the power entrusted to him is temporary. He enters office to carry out a defined task and, when it is completed, returns to being an ordinary citizen. This reduces the incentive to treat public office as a personal asset or a means of private advancement, and limits the corruption that can accompany prolonged residence in positions of power.

To prevent corrupt compensation from merely being postponed until after a term of office, there will also be a significant cooling-off period. During that period, a former officeholder may not accept a position, salary, consulting fee, or other benefit from a company or party materially affected by decisions he made while in office. A promise of future employment or compensation made during the term will constitute a serious conflict of interest and a corruption offense.

It is neither possible nor necessary to ensure that every person has identical public influence. A person with success, reputation, knowledge, an audience, or financial means may be able to make his voice heard more strongly. The important distinction is between influence arising from free persuasion and power purchased from the state. A wealthy person is free to try to persuade the public; he is not free to buy a law, an appointment, or a government benefit.

Relations between the state and private companies will likewise require safeguards against the creation of entrenched favored contractors. Government contracts will be public, time-limited, and subject to a competitive process. Engagement with a supplier will be limited to six years, after which a change of supplier will be required, in order to prevent long-term mutual dependence between a particular company and the government apparatus.

Elected officials and senior officeholders will be required to disclose assets, holdings, and economic interests capable of creating conflicts of interest. They may not participate in a decision that directly benefits themselves, their family, or a company under their control. A direct financial conflict that cannot be resolved will prevent appointment or require termination of office.

The prohibition on monopolies is also intended to prevent concentrations of economic power capable of becoming political power. A company will not be allowed to use proximity to government to block competitors, obtain exclusivity, or shape regulation for its own benefit. Where a monopoly arises, it will be broken up or subjected to a mechanism that creates genuine competition.

There is no need to eliminate the public influence of wealth in a free society, but it must be prevented from becoming a corrupting power.

No constitution protects itself. If constitutional limits are to survive over time, they cannot depend on the decency or good intentions of elected officials. Several independent layers of protection must be built so that any deviation is difficult to carry out, visible to the public, and capable of being stopped.

At the head of Yehodaya’s legal hierarchy will stand the Bill of Rights. Beneath it will be the Constitution, followed by laws enacted by the Sanhedrin, and at the lowest level, regulations issued by the President. Any law, regulation, or government action that contradicts a higher level will be void. No authority will be able to expand its own powers through ordinary legislation or administrative decision.

The Bill of Rights will receive especially strong entrenchment. Amending, reducing, or repealing any of the rights listed in it will require approval by 90% of the members of the Sanhedrin, followed by the support of more than 80% of all eligible voters. An amendment to the Constitution will require the support of at least 75% in a referendum in which at least 75% of eligible voters participate. The rules of the game therefore cannot be changed by a temporary political majority.

The Constitutional Court will be able to invalidate any law, regulation, or governmental decision that conflicts with the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Its judges will not be appointed by the President or the Sanhedrin, but elected directly by the public from among candidates who have passed a blind constitutional qualification examination. They will serve a single nine-year term in staggered cycles and will undertake to interpret the constitutional documents according to their text and ordinary meaning. In this way, no government will be able to appoint the judges who will review its own actions.

Separation of powers will create mechanisms of mutual oversight:

• The Sanhedrin will legislate and supervise the government but will not itself execute the laws.
• The President will administer the executive branch, but presidential regulations will remain subordinate to legislation, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.
• The Constitutional Court will be able to stop violations by both branches, but it will not be permitted to write a new constitution through interpretation.
• An independent auditing authority will examine the work of the Sanhedrin, the government, and the Constitutional Court and publish its findings.
• The people will elect the principal officeholders and decide directly on constitutional amendments and major national questions.

The President and members of the Sanhedrin will serve only one term. This limitation will prevent them from accumulating personal power over decades, taking control of state institutions, or building political machinery whose purpose is to perpetuate their rule. Staggered elections to the Sanhedrin and the Constitutional Court will also prevent all centers of power from being replaced or captured at once.

A serious constitutional violation will constitute grounds for removal from office. Proceedings to remove a President may be initiated by a qualified majority in the Sanhedrin or directly by citizens, followed by a referendum. The auditing authorities will likewise be able to initiate processes leading to correction of deficiencies or the removal of an officeholder who has abused his position.

A central element of constitutional protection will be fiscal. The government will not be able to incur debt, spend more than actual revenues, or increase tax rates without public approval. The Sanhedrin will have no authority to legislate benefits, subsidies, or allocations to interest groups. This constrains one of the most common paths by which government gradually expands: the creation of new programs while shifting their cost to future generations.

Nor will a state of emergency grant the government open-ended authority. Declaring an emergency will require grounds defined in the Constitution and approval by two-thirds of the members of the Sanhedrin. An emergency tax will expire automatically within 12 months or upon termination of the emergency, whichever occurs first. Extending it will require renewed approval in a referendum. Exceptional authority that does not expire on its own quickly becomes ordinary authority; the expiration mechanism will therefore be automatic.

The budget, work plans, contracts, performance reports, and audit reports will be open to the public digitally and in real time, except for classified security information. Transparency is not merely a declarative value; it enables citizens, the press, and oversight bodies to identify governmental expansion before it becomes a permanent fact.

Finally, the most important protection is a public that regards the Constitution as a binding compact rather than a recommendation. Institutions can slow constitutional erosion, but citizens must refuse to accept it. The Constitution and Bill of Rights should therefore be short, clear, accessible, and familiar to every citizen. Another central pillar in protecting Yehodaya’s principles will be educating future generations about liberty, the state’s libertarian principles, social involvement, and active participation in the institutions of government through elections and referendums. This will receive major emphasis.

The Bill of Rights and the Constitution are not additions attached to an existing state. They are the founding compact that defines what state is being established, what powers it possesses, and what it is forbidden to do. In Yehodaya’s case, the state does not precede the Constitution—it is created by it.

Establishing the state before determining its Constitution would create a period in which a temporary governing body held land, money, security mechanisms, and administrative powers before its limits had been defined. Once centers of power have already been created, officeholders will have an interest in shaping the Constitution around the powers they have accumulated. A temporary arrangement can quickly become a permanent reality.

Yehodaya seeks to reverse that order: first define the limits of power, and only then entrust power to the institutions of the state.

The people who will be asked to take part in establishing Yehodaya must also know in advance what they are joining. A person cannot reasonably be asked to invest capital, move his family, build a business, or tie his future to a state whose principles, system of government, and citizens’ rights will be determined only afterward. The Bill of Rights and the Constitution are part of the proposition Yehodaya presents to its founders and future residents.

The same is true of the state transferring the territory and of the countries that will be asked to recognize Yehodaya. The agreement transferring sovereignty must identify to whom authority is being transferred, how the new government will operate, and what constitutional and legal commitments it assumes.

Drafting these documents in advance does not mean that the Founding Council may grant itself authority to impose a constitution on the future citizens of the state. Its role will be to prepare a professional draft, publish it, allow discussion and criticism, and amend it before establishment.

The Bill of Rights requires even stronger protection. A person’s natural rights are not created by majority vote, and a temporary majority therefore has no authority to abolish them. Founding ratification does not grant a person his rights; it binds the state to recognize them and prevents its institutions from violating them.

After Yehodaya is established, its citizens will be able to amend the Constitution through the amendment mechanism it contains. In this way the Constitution can develop, but it will not change with every passing political wave.

First the founding covenant and the limits of government are established. Only then is government created and entrusted with power.