Powers, Limitations, and Oversight Duties of the Sanhedrin

A. Legislative Authority and Budgetary Limitation

1. The Sanhedrin is authorized to enact and amend civil, criminal, and administrative laws, provided that they do not conflict with the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.

2. Prohibition of Sector-Specific Economic Legislation: The Sanhedrin is constitutionally prohibited from enacting legislation with financial or economic implications where its implementation would affect the allocation of tax revenue, create a deficit, or require the imposition of new taxes.

   Legislation granting targeted benefits, financial support, or subsidies to particular sectors, interest groups, or private or public economic entities falls outside the Sanhedrin’s authority and will be automatically invalidated by the Constitutional Court.

B. Approval of the State Budget

The Sanhedrin is responsible for approving the annual state budget submitted by the executive branch.

If the budget has not been approved by the beginning of the fiscal year, a continuing budget based on the previous year’s budget and adjusted for inflation will automatically take effect. This is intended to prevent governmental paralysis from being used as a means of political pressure.

Oversight Duties and the Establishment of Monitoring Committees

1. The Sanhedrin’s central role is to exercise close and direct oversight of the executive branch. For this purpose, permanent Sanhedrin committees will be established corresponding to each government ministry, together with a special committee responsible for oversight of the Office of the President.
2. The committees will continuously and publicly monitor the implementation of approved work plans and the use of approved budgets. They will have full authority to demand documents and financial information and to conduct public hearings involving ministers and officials.
3. Sanhedrin committees will have no executive or managerial authority within government ministries. However, where a ministry persistently and materially departs from its approved work plan or budget, the relevant committee may issue a severe warning report and formally demand that the President replace the responsible minister.
4. If the President refuses to replace the minister, the committee may submit its report to the full Sanhedrin for a targeted vote of no confidence in that minister. If the report receives a qualified majority of two thirds of the members of the Sanhedrin, the minister will be removed immediately. The President will then be required to appoint another qualified professional within 14 days.

Approval of Senior Security Appointments

1. Appointments to the state’s most senior security and law-enforcement positions - Chief of the General Staff, Commissioner of Police, Commissioner of the Prison Service, Director of the Internal Security Service, Director of the External Intelligence Service, and Commissioner of Fire and Rescue Services - will be made by the President but will require approval by an absolute majority of the full Sanhedrin.
2. If the Sanhedrin refuses to approve the President’s nominee and the two branches fail to reach agreement within 30 days, the matter will be referred to the sovereign. The President will nominate one candidate, the Sanhedrin will nominate an alternative, and the two candidates will be submitted to the people in an expedited referendum.
3. During the interim period, pending the referendum, the deputy commander of the relevant security body will serve as acting commander. The acting commander’s authority will be limited to routine operational activities.

Before the referendum, the complete records concerning the qualifications, experience, and suitability of both candidates, together with the considerations supporting their nominations, must be disclosed publicly.